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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous research has contributed much to our understanding of the relationship between 
corporate diversification strategy and corporate governance quality. The majority of 
published works has been on sophisticated and mature markets in first world nations. This 
paper extends previous knowledge by examining this relationship in a developing country. 
Malaysia is a developing country that provides a rich setting for corporate governance 
research. The structure of the business environment and the availability of published data 
make it an interesting research site. 
 
The results showed that outside blockholding especially non-institutional blockholding was 
negatively associated with diversification. However, evidence of significant relationship 
between managerial ownership and diversification was not found although the directions were 
generally as expected. Similarly, good corporate governance was shown to reduce 
diversification activities. The variable for separate board structure was consistently 
significant in most of the estimations. However, the other measure of corporate governance 
namely the proportion of outside directors was not as significant as might be expected. The 
study opens the way for a richer understanding of the links between corporate governance, 
ownership structure and corporate diversification in a developing country. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Corporate governance systems vary a great deal around the world. In Malaysia, 
debates on corporate governance began to be highlighted following the East Asian 
financial crisis in the middle of 1997. Prior to that, a number of companies in 
Malaysia had expanded and diversified due to the availability of easy credits at a 
relatively low cost to borrowers (Fatimah, 2001). Initially, diversification has some 
economic and strategic values (Choo Kah Yean, 1999). Over time, however, these 
companies are likely to be diversified beyond core competencies and capabilities, as 
they are ambitiously involved in unrelated businesses (Choo Kah Yean, 1999). 
Previous studies have found that firms which diversified into unrelated business were 
less profitable than other diversified firms (Palepu, 1985). It is believed that 
diversification into unrelated areas which companies have no expertise in is one of the 
causes of the financial crisis (Fatimah, 2001). Arguably, the decision to diversify into 
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unrelated businesses could have resulted from the lack of proper governance 
mechanisms. 
 
Recently, the government has taken a few steps to review and strengthen corporate 
governance in Malaysia, such as the establishment of the Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance and the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG). 
A few authorities, namely the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and the Securities Commission (SC) have 
introduced certain requirements to enhance good corporate governance. 
 
Most of the articles of association of Malaysian firms delegate all powers of 
management to the board of directors.1  Thus, shareholders are not entitled to override 
the board of directors' decisions unless in matters specifically reserved to the general 
meeting where shareholders have their right to vote. Although shareholders are the 
owners of the business, extensive power to control is vested in the board of directors 
that manage the firm. This division of power creates separation of ownership and 
control. Conflict of interests between shareholders and managers in the firms may 
lead to agency problems (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
To satisfy the interest of shareholders, managers should pursue strategies that are 
consistent with maximizing shareholders' wealth. However, absence of governance 
control will lead managers to pursue strategies that may deviate from the interest of 
the shareholders. High-risk high-return strategies and less diversification are attractive 
to shareholders who hold a diversified portfolio of investment. However, as opposed 
to shareholders, the managers' wealth is not well diversified and hence, they depend 
on the survival of the firm. Therefore, managers prefer low risk strategies to avoid 
being associated with financially distressed firms. Managers prefer to reduce their 
employment-risk through corporate diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1981) 
Furthermore, corporate diversification may provide other private benefits to 
managers. For example, diversification might benefit managers through the power 
and prestige associated with managing a larger firm (Jensen, 1986); managerial 
compensation which is positively related to firm size (Jensen & Murphy, 1990); and 
make managers indispensable to the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). As a result, 
managers may pursue diversification strategies even though shareholders' interests 
might be at stake. 
 
Although risk-reduction, earning smoothing, increased debt capacity and 
administration economies of scale are often cited as economic gains from 
diversification, recently many researchers find that the diversification strategies might 
not benefit shareholders (Byrd & Hickman, 1997). Various control mechanisms such 
as effective board monitoring on managers (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990), 
managerial ownership (Denis et al., 1997), outside blockholder ownership (Denis      
et al., 1997) and institutional shareholding (Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991), have 
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been suggested to help mitigate the agency cost associated with diversification 
strategy.  
  
Most of the empirical studies on corporate diversification have been conducted in 
developed countries. However, in developing countries like Malaysia, the practices of 
corporate governance may be different from that of developed countries such as 
United States, Germany and Japan that have relatively successful corporate 
governance systems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) due to corporation law, economic, 
cultural and political differences. To date, published empirical studies on the 
relationship between governance control and corporate diversification in Malaysia are 
virtually negligible.  
 
The objectives of this study are: 
 
1. to examine the influence of board structure on diversification of the public listed 
firms in Malaysia. 
2. to examine the relationship between ownership structure and diversification of 
the public listed firms in Malaysia. 
 
The findings of this study will provide information to business communities to assess 
corporate governance practices in Malaysia and also to regulatory agencies to develop 
better corporate governance framework.  
 
 
THEORETICAL AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Corporate Diversification 
 
Different perspectives of managers and shareholders on risks and return aspect in 
diversification strategies motivate most researchers to study mechanisms that might 
alter the risks preferential of manager-agent to align them with the interests of 
shareholder-principal. Agency theory explains that diversification is driven by 
managers' interests such as employment risk-reduction, power, prestige and high 
compensation. On the other hand, shareholders can diversify their portfolios at low 
cost to balance their investment risk and therefore they might not favor corporate 
diversification strategies. Due to the nature of corporate structure, shareholders might 
be forced to accept the firms diversification strategy although it might not suit their 
risk and return profiles. Hence, agency theory would predict a negative relationship 
between diversification and firm value. A few studies, which examined the 
relationship between firm performance and diversification, found negative or 
insignificant relationship between the two variables (Lang & Stulz, 1994; Rumelt, 
1982; Montgomery, 1985). Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) showed that firm 
profitability decreases as measure of diversification increases.  
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Montgomery (1994) concluded that diversification is not a guaranteed route to 
success. The study found that, on average, firms with a higher level of diversification 
are less profitable than firms with lower level of diversification. Since over-
diversified firms in the U.S. in 1960s and 1970s did not increase firm value (Jensen, 
1986), a substantial number of the firms later divested in 1990s (Kaplan & Weisbach, 
1992). Interestingly, Denis et al., 1997 found that the decreases in diversification were 
associated with corporate events such as acquisition attempt, block purchase and 
indications of financial distress. The issue here is why do firms diversify if 
diversification is likely to be negatively related to their performance.  
  
Ownership Structure 
 
Management ownership is one of the incentives in aligning the interest of managers 
with that of shareholders. In addition, the presence of outside blockholders is also an 
important mechanism in corporate governance (Byrd, Parrino & Pritsch, 1998). 
However, large ownership or ownership concentration may contribute to deficiencies 
in corporate governance (Thillainathan, 1999). In Malaysia the controlling-
shareholder (i.e. those holding more than 50% ownership) through the pyramid 
structure is common (Thillainathan, 1999). The controlling shareholders, either 
individuals/families or corporations, are in the position to expropriate minority 
interests using their dominant voting right.  
 
Denis et al. (1997) showed that the level of diversification is negatively related to 
managerial ownership. When managers own substantial firm equity, they are likely to 
have incentives to keep the strategies in line with the preferences of other owners 
since their bonding to firms' outcome is high (Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, this 
relationship depends largely on the level of ownership. An increase in managerial 
ownership is likely to be associated with a decrease in diversification. Amihud and 
Lev (1981) suggested that manager-controlled firms engaged more in conglomerate 
acquisition than owner-controlled firms, due to their greater need for personal risk 
reduction. This can be characterized as agency conflicts between the owner and the 
manager that are derived from the manager's tendency to appropriate perquisites out 
of firms' resources for his own consumption (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, it is 
hypothesized (in alternative form) that, 
 
H1 : Diversification is negatively related to managerial ownership. 
 
The individual shareholders in firms that have wide dispersed ownership do not have 
sufficient incentives to monitor the behavior of managers. The investors can take a 
free ride and are more likely to rely on others to govern the management (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972). Holderness and Sheehan (1988) discovered that majority-
shareholders (controlling-shareholders) are usually directly involved in management. 
They represent their own interests that need not coincide with the interests of other 
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shareholders in the firm. They may agree with diversification to reduce their risk just 
as managers do (Amihud & Lev, 1981). However, most researchers suggest that 
greater concentration of shares (outside blockholder ownership) will lead to a more 
effective alignment of interests between management and shareholders, resulting in 
higher performance (Li and Simerly, 1998). Denis et al. (1997), Bethel and 
Liebeskind (1993) and Hill and Snell  (1988) found that outside blockholder 
ownership results in reduction in diversification and that blockholders have a 
disciplinary effect on managers. Thus, this study also examines the relationship of 
outside blockholders' ownership with levels of diversification. It is hypothesized (in 
alternative form) that,  
 
H2 : Diversification is negatively related to outside blockholders' ownership. 
 
Outside blockholders can be institutional or non-institutional shareholders. Whilst 
outside blockholders are generally known to have significant impact on corporate 
strategies, the role of the institutional blockholders is less clear. Large size of 
shareholding by institutional blockholder may also provide sufficient incentives to 
monitor management. For example, McConnell and Servaes (1990) proved that the 
percentage of shares owned by institutional shareholders are positively and 
significantly related to performance as measured by Tobin's Q. In addition, research 
done in Malaysia found that firms with significant institutional shareholders are 
associated with better performance than firms with negligible institutional 
shareholders (Shamsul Nahar et al., 1998). Therefore, this study also investigates the 
influence of outside block ownership on diversification strategy separately for 
individual and institutional shareholders (Baysinger et al., 1991). The hypotheses are 
stated (in alternative form) as: 
 
H2A : Diversification is negatively related to institutional ownership. 
 
H2B : Diversification is negatively related to non-institutional ownership.  
 
Board Structure 
 
Besides managerial and outside block ownership, many advocate that boards 
comprising a majority of outside directors may reduce conflict of interests (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Kosnik, 1987).  Boards' composition and structure could play an 
important role to moderate the activities of management (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 
1990). The Finance Committee in its Report on Corporate Governance, which sets out 
the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, views that good corporate governance 
rests firmly with the board of directors. The Code regards improving board 
composition as important to ensure that there are effective independent members on 
the board and that the decision process is independently carried out. Sufficient 
independent directors are particularly important when dealing with responsibilities 
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such as financial reporting, determining managers' and directors' remuneration and 
other strategic decision makings. The KLSE listing requirements, which were 
revamped in 2001, state that at least one-third of the board should comprise of 
independent, non-executive directors. Under the new code, the audit, remuneration 
and nomination committees must consist of at least two independent, non-executive 
directors. 
 
An increase in ratio of outside to inside directors is likely to enhance control over 
managerial performance (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Beasley (1996) showed that the 
incidence of financial frauds is negatively related to the ratio of outside directors. 
Zantout & O'Reilly-Allen (1996) found that the probability of diversification 
decreases when there is an outside-dominated board. Therefore, this study predicts 
that firms with board composition dominated by outside directors are less engaged in 
diversification activities. Based on this reasoning, it is hypothesized (in alternative 
form) that, 
 
H3  :  Diversification is negatively related to the proportion of outside directors to 
total directors. 
 
To reduce agency cost created by the separation of ownership and control, agency 
theory suggests separate leadership structure, i.e. firms should have different people 
to hold the chairmanship of the corporate board and the CEO position (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). It is difficult for an individual who serves as both chairman and CEO 
to perform his duties objectively. Fosberg and Nelson (1999) concluded in their study 
that firms that adopt a separate leadership structure significantly improved their 
financial performance over a three year period following the change to separate 
leadership structure. Thus, this study also examines the relationship of separate 
leadership structure with levels of diversification. It is hypothesized (in alternative 
form) that, 
 
H4 : Diversification is negatively related to separate leadership structure. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data Collection 
 
The sample size in this study was determined based on the recommendation table by 
Sekaran (2000). Given the population size of 529 firms listed on the KLSE (excluding 
financial and banking industries) as of 31 December 1995, the suggested sample size 
is between 217 and 226 (Sekaran, 2000). KLSE industry classification was used to 
stratify the population. Then, from each stratum, the sample was systematically 
selected. A final sample of 236 public companies that were listed on the Kuala 
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Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) in 1995 were utilized. The year 1995 was chosen 
since the economic and political environments were stable. As mentioned before, 
during opulent economic times, most of the companies were involved in frantic 
diversification activities (Choo, 1999).  Data were hand-collected using annual reports 
of the firms for financial year ending 1995. KLSE and the annual handbook. 
 
Model Specification and Variables Measurement 
 
To test the relationship between ownership and board structure with corporate 
diversification the following models were utilized:  
 
Model A 
DIVERSIFICATION = β0 + β1MOWN + β2BOWN + β3OUTDIR + 
β4LEADSTR + β5FSIZE + β6LEV + β7FAGE + 
β8ROE + ei 
 
Where, 
  
DIVERSIFICATION (measured using three different proxies): 
 
 = Number of segments (NSEG) 
 = Herfindahl index constructed from sales (HSALES) 
 = Herfindahl index constructed from assets                  
(HASSETS) 
MOWN = percentage of ordinary shares owned by executive 
directors as a group  
BOWN = percentage of ordinary shares owned by outside 
blockholders (at least five percent) 
OUTDIR = proportion of non-executive directors to total board 
composition 
LEADSTR = binary variable with a firm having separate leadership 
coded as 1 and other firms coded as 0 
FSIZE = Log10total assets 
LEV = long term debt-to-total asset ratio (excluding deferred 
tax) 
FAGE = number of years the firm has been listed 
ROE = return on equity 
ei = a random error term 
i = indicating data for the ith firm 
 
Model A is used to test Hypotheses H1, H2, H3 and H4. In order to test H2A and H2B, 
the following model is estimated:  
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Model B 
DIVERSIFICATION = β0 + β1MOWN + β2ISOWN + β3NINOWN + 
β4OUTDIR + β5LEADSTR + β6FSIZE + β7LEV + 
β8FAGE + β9ROE + ei 
 
Where, 
 
All variables are measured as in Model A except: 
 
ISOWN = percentage of ordinary share owned by block 
institutional shareholders  
NINOWN = percentage of ordinary share owned by block non-
institutional shareholders  
   
The following section discusses the measurement of variables included in the models. 
 
Corporate Diversification 
 
Data on diversification used in this study was based on information in the segmental 
disclosure in notes to the account of the firms' annual reports. As required by the 
Companies Act 1965, all companies have to disclose turnover and profit before tax 
for each class of business. In addition, Accounting Standard (IAS 14) which is 
approved by the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) requires all public 
listed companies to report information for industrial and geographical segments 
whose sales, assets or net profit represent ten percent or more of consolidation total.2 
 
Diversification was measured based on three proxies namely, the number of business 
segments (NSEG), Herfindahl (H) index constructed from sales (HSALES) and 
Herfindahl (H) index constructed from assets (HASSETS) (Lang & Stulz, 1994; 
Denis et al., 1997). Only information on industrial segment was used. 
 
The formulae for the H index are as follows: 
 
H salesi  = ∑(Sales per segment/Total sales)2 
 
H assetsi  = ∑(Asset per segment/Total assets)2 
 
Managerial Ownership 
 
Managerial ownership (MOWN) was measured using percentage of shares owned by 
executive directors as a group (Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994). The measure 
included both direct and indirect interests in the company. 
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Outside Blockholder Ownership 
 
Blockholder ownership (BOWN) was measured by percentage of ordinary share 
owned by outside major shareholders3 (Denis et al., 1997). In addition, blockholders 
were divided into institutional shareholders (ISOWN) and non-institutional 
shareholders (NINOWN). Institutional shareholders include insurance companies, 
pension funds and professional fund managers that hold shares on behalf of 
individuals.4 
 
Outside Directors 
 
Outside directors' influence (OUTDIR) was measured by proportion of non-executive 
directors to total board composition (Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998). The information 
is disclosed in the director's report.  
 
Leadership Structure 
 
Leadership Structure (LEADSTR) was measured using a binary variable with firms 
having separate leadership coded as 1 and other firms coded as 0 (Zajac & Westphal, 
1996).  
 
Based on previous research, four (4) controlling variables are utilized in this study. 
Whilst we concentrate on hypothesis variables and their effects on diversification 
(dependent variable), there are other factors that might affect diversification and the 
results would be confounded if we cannot control the effects that different factors 
might have on diversification. They are: 
 
1. Firm size (FSIZE) which was measured as logarithm to the base of 10 of total 
assets of a company. 
2. Leverage (LEV) which was measured as proportion of long-term debt 
(excluding deferred tax) to total equity in a company. 
3. Firm age (FAGE) which was measured as number of years the firm has been 
listed. 
4. Profitability (ROE) was measured as return on equity. 
  
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive and Univariate Analyses 
 
As discussed earlier, the sample of 236 public companies that were listed on Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) in 1995 were selected. However, seventeen (17) 
companies were eliminated, leaving 219 companies in the final sample. Four (4) 
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companies stated (in their annual reports) that they did not comply with IAS 14 in 
terms of segmental disclosure. Thirteen (13) companies changed their financial year-
ends and that made comparison of corporate annual data inappropriate. Table 1 
describes the number of  business segments disclosed in the company annual reports. 
 
TABLE 1 
NUMBER OF SEGMENTS DISCLOSED IN THE COMPANY  
ANNUAL REPORTS (N = 219) 
 
Number of 
segments 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
percent 
1 101 46.1 46.1 
2 18 8.2 54.3 
3 23 10.5 64.8 
4 31 14.2 79.0 
5 23 10.5 89.5 
6 11 5.0 94.5 
7 5 2.3 96.8 
8 5 2.3 99.1 
9 2 0.9 100.0 
Total 219 100.0  
 
Note:  Segments are lines of business for which separate accounting 
disclosures are made by management in accordance with IAS 14. 
Single-segment companies are those reporting exactly one 
segment in the annual reports, whereas multi-segment companies 
are those reporting two or more segments. 
 
53.9 percent of the companies in the sample were multi-segment companies and 46.1 
percent were single-segment companies. The majority of  multi-segment companies 
had three to four lines of businesses. The highest segment was nine but only two 
companies were involved in nine lines of businesses. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for continuous and dichotomous variables. 
The totals are in Malaysian Ringgit (RM). 
 
The percentage of management ownership for the sample population (all cases) 
ranged from zero to 100 percent, with average shareholding of about 30 percent.5  The 
outside blockholding ranged from 0 to about 90 percent, with average shareholding of 
about 27 percent. The proportion of outside directors to total directors varied from    
21 percent to 100 percent, with average proportion of outside directors of about        
70 percent.  In terms of leadership structure, 89 percent of the companies have 
separate leadership for the posts of CEO and the board chairman. The sample 
companies had an average gearing level (LEV) of about 10 percent and average ROE 
of about 29 percent which were very similar to the study by Ayoib and Houghton 
(2000) which utilized the total population of KLSE listed companies in 1993–1995. 
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TABLE 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES (N = 219)* 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
NSEG 0.00 9.00 2.300 2.460 
HSALES 0.00 1.00 0.324 0.343 
HASSETS 0.00 0.97 0.269 0.292 
MOWN 0.00 100.00 26.599 30.457 
BOWN 0.00 90.04 34.145 27.003 
ISOWN 0.00 69.84 4.788 11.006 
NINOWN 0.00 90.04 29.494 26.618 
OUTDIR 0.21 1.00 0.699 0.169 
LEADSTR 0.00 1.00 0.890 0.310 
FSIZE 8.29 16.71 12.414 1.428 
LEV 0.00 0.46 0.079 0.103 
AGE 0.07 35.10 10.636 10.746 
ROE –2.66 2.13 0.288 0.360 
 
*  For dichotomous variable, the mean represents the proportion of firms with value 
equal to 1 for the variable. 
 
Table 3 exhibits a matrix of correlations for the variables for both parametric and non-
parametric statistics. 
 
The overall correlations among the explanatory variables were relatively low and 
below 0.5, except for the correlation between MOWN and BOWN, and MOWN and 
NINOWN.  As expected, the correlations between the variables that represent 
managerial ownership and outside shareholding were negative and high indicating the 
dominating nature of the relationship. Whilst multicollinearity is not a problem in this 
study, further tests are provided and discussed in a later section.6 
 
Table 4 provides the results of the T-test and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test for mean 
and distribution differences between single and multi-segment companies.7 
 
Generally, the results provided directional support to the theory proposed earlier. All 
of the hypothesis variables were in the predicted directions. However, only OUTDIR 
was significantly (albeit weakly) associated with diversification. This was consistent 
with the notion that the larger the proportion of outside directors in the board, the 
lower would be the level of diversification. Whilst univariate tests provide 
preliminary insight and have an advantage in that measurement errors in one 
independent variable do not affect the test results for other variables, they do take into 
account any interrelationship among the independent variables. This may diminish the 
usefulness of these comparisons. The following section discusses the results of the 
multivariate analysis. 
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Table 3 
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TABLE 4 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (IN PARENTHESIS) OF THE INDEPENDENT  
VARIABLES BETWEEN SINGLE-SEGMENT (SS) AND  
MULTI-SEGMENT (MS) COMPANIESa 
 
Variable Expected 
sign 
MS 
(N = 118) 
SS 
(N = 101) 
T-Test 
 
Wilcoxon Z 
MOWN – 25.83 
(28.44) 
27.50 
(32.78) 
–0.405  
BOWN – 32.07 
(27.73) 
36.57 
(26.05) 
–1.232  
ISOWN – 4.63 
(11.20)   
4.98 
(10.83) 
–0.232  
NINOWN – 27.69 
(27.42) 
31.60 
(25.63) 
–1.083  
OUTDIR – 0.68 
(0.17) 
0.72 
(0.16) 
–1.421†  
LEADSTR – 0.87 
(0.33) 
0.92 
(0.27) 
 –1.150 
FSIZE +/– 12.95 
(1.30) 
11.79 
(1.31) 
6.533*  
LEV +/– 0.09 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
2.209#  
AGE +/– 13.03 
(10.52) 
7.83 
(10.37) 
3.669*  
ROE +/– 0.26  
(0.38) 
0.33 
(0.33) 
–1.409  
 
a  For binary variable, the mean represents the proportion of firms with value equal to 1 
for the variable. 
*  Significant at 1 percent level (one-tailed where signs are expected, two-tailed 
otherwise). 
#  Significant at 5 percent level (one-tailed where signs are expected, two-tailed 
otherwise). 
†  Significant at 10 percent level (one-tailed where signs are expected, two-tailed 
otherwise). 
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Multivariate Analysis 
 
Table 5 presents the results of multivariate regressions used to test the hypotheses 
stated earlier. 
 
TABLE 5 
EXPLAINING DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY: RESULTS OF ORDINARY LEAST SQUARE 
REGRESSIONa  (N=219) (NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS ARE T – STATISTICS) 
 
Independent 
variables b 
Expected 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
MOWN – –0.002 
(–0.28) 
0.001 
(–0.40) 
–0.001 
(–0.73) 
–0.003 
(–0.42) 
0.001 
(–0.23) 
–0.001 
(–0.75) 
BOWN – –0.013 
(–1.70#) 
–0.001 
(–0.98) 
–0.001 
(–1.39†) 
– – – 
ISOWN – – – – –0.003 
(–0.19) 
–0.002 
(–1.13) 
–0.001 
(–0.81) 
NINOWN – – – – –0.015 
(–1.86#) 
–0.001 
(–0.71) 
–0.001 
(–1.40†) 
OUTDIR – –0.484 
(–0.46) 
–0.129 
(–0.80) 
0.004 
(0.03) 
–0.547 
(–0.52) 
–0.129 
(–0.81) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
LEADSTR – –0.609 
(–1.81#) 
–0.115 
(–1.54†) 
–0.029 
(–0.48) 
–0.615 
(–1.82#) 
–0.117 
(–1.56†) 
–0.030 
(–0.50) 
FSIZE +/– 0.921 
(7.57*) 
0.085 
(5.24*) 
0.056 
(3.84*) 
0.918 
(7.58*) 
0.085 
(5.22*) 
0.056 
(3.83*) 
LEV +/– 0.316 
(0.18) 
–0.306 
(–1.43) 
–0.020 
(–0.10) 
0.373 
(0.21) 
–0.310 
(–1.45) 
–0.021 
(–0.11) 
AGE +/– 0.030 
(2.13#) 
0.004 
(2.10#) 
0.004 
(1.92†) 
0.031 
(2.15#) 
0.004 
(2.09#) 
0.004 
(1.91†) 
ROE +/– –1.141 
(–2.64*) 
–0.206 
(–3.79*) 
–0.179 
(–4.10*) 
–1.170 
(–2.69*) 
–0.204 
(–3.75*) 
–0.178 
(–4.04*) 
Constant +/– –7.769 
(–4.23*) 
–0.457 
(–1.81†) 
–0.326 
(–1.46) 
–7.658 
(–4.19*) 
–0.461 
(–1.80†) 
–0.318 
(–1.41) 
F-Stat  15.01* 6.71* 5.33* 13.33* 5.86* 4.76* 
Adj. R2  0.3344 0.1705 0.1318 0.3367 0.1759 0.1326 
 
a  The results were adjusted for heteroscedasticity using the method of Cook and Weisberg (1982). 
b  Variables are defined in Table 3. 
*  Significant at 1 percent level (one-tailed where signs are expected, two-tailed otherwise). 
#  Significant at 5 percent level (one-tailed where signs are expected, two-tailed otherwise). 
†  Significant at 10 percent level (one-tailed where signs are expected, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 5 presents the regression results for all hypotheses. The results were adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity using the method of Cook and Weisberg (1982) since the 
diagnostic tests revealed that the assumption of homoscedastic disturbances (ei) was 
violated.8 The dependent variable is diversification proxied by three (3) measures 
namely, NSEG (number of business segments) for Model 1 and Model 4, Herfindahl 
(H) index constructed from sales (HSALES) for Model 2 and Model 5, and 
Herfindahl (H) index constructed from assets (HASSETS) for Model 3 and Model 6. 
The models were all significant at p < 0.001 and the adjusted R2 ranged from            
13 percent to 34 percent. The Variance-Inflating Factors (VIFs) for all variables in all 
regressions were well below three (3) and this suggests multicollinearity was not a 
problem in this analysis (see endnote 6). Similarly, the regression models were 
correctly specified. The Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of the 
dependent variable showed no specification bias. 
 
In all six models, the coefficients for managerial ownership (MOWN) (Hypothesis 
H1) and institutional shareholding (ISOWN) (Hypothesis H2a) were not significant 
although they were in the predicted directions. The results suggest that increases in 
managerial ownership and institutional shareholding do not reduce diversification as 
conjectured by the agency theory. The result is similar to Zantout and O'Reilly-Allen 
(1996) who also did not find that managerial stock ownership to be related to 
diversification. Similarly, proportion of outside directors to total directors (OUTDIR) 
(Hypothesis H3) were not significant in all estimations and in two regressions, the 
signs were in the opposite directions. It seems that the presence of outside directors 
on the board does not influence the decision process with regards to diversification 
strategy. Perhaps, outside directors were unable to control diversification activities as 
they did not have contact with the daily operations of the firm (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990). Further, they might have been appointed based on their relationship 
with the CEO (Mace, 1986). Another reason could be attributed to the fact that there 
is a limited pool of qualified individuals in Malaysia as most of the outside directors 
tend to be from the elite group including influential politicians, high-ranking ex-army 
or ex-police officers, members of royalty and government bureaucrats (Horii, 1991). 
 
Consistent with expectations, diversification was negatively related to separate 
leadership structure. This is similar to the finding by Zantout and O'Reilly-Allen 
(1996). The variable LEADSTR was statistically significant at five percent level in 
Model 1 and Model 4 and 10 percent significant level in Model 2 and Model 5. 
However, LEADSTR was not significant in Model 3 and Model 6 although the signs 
were in the predicted directions. Interestingly, the presence of external blockholders 
(BOWN) was found to significantly reduce diversification activities. The variable was 
significant in Model 1 (p < 0.05) and Model 3 (p < 0.10).  The results suggest that 
blockholders help to monitor the activities of the managers (Demsetz, 1983).  The 
results also support the earlier finding by Denis et al. (1997). Model 4 and Model 6 
revealed that the main effects were due to the presence of non-institutional 
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shareholding as indicated in higher confidence level in Model 4 and Model 6 as 
compared to Model 2 and Model 4 respectively. The result implies that institutional 
investors are less effective as compared to non-institutional investors in monitoring 
managers. 
 
The results of the control variables were also interesting. Except leverage, all other 
control variables were statistically significant. Firm size and age were positive and 
significant in all estimations indicating that as corporate size grows and age of the 
firm increases, the firm is likely to diversify more into unrelated businesses in search 
of new opportunities. Consistent with previous studies (Wenerfelt & Montgomery, 
1988), the variable that proxied for profitability (ROE) was negative and significant 
in most estimations. This shows that corporate profitability decreases as 
diversification increases and it reinforces the view that diversification is undertaken 
for reasons other than performance maximization (Montgomery, 1994). 
 
The results also showed that Model 1 and Model 3 provided better goodness of fits 
than other models as shown by higher adjusted R2. Similarly, the overall significance 
of the multiple regression models were more pronounced in Model 1 and Model 3 as 
indicated by higher F-statistics. In other words, the number of business segments 
(NSEG) is a better measurement for diversification than the Herfindahl Index for this 
study. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Additional analyses9 were carried out to examine the sensitivity of the models to the 
size effect, different regression technique and different measures of dependent and 
hypothesis variables. Firstly, FSIZE was dropped from the equation and  the model 
was re-estimated. The results for the hypothesis variables were similar except for the 
variable OUTDIR in Model 1, Model 2, Model 4 and Model 5. The variable OUTDIR 
was negative and significant at 10 percent level (one-tailed) in those models. 
 
Secondly, MOWN, BOWN and NINOWN were dropped one at a time from the 
equation and the model was re-estimated. This is because they were highly correlated 
with one another. The results for the independent variables were qualitatively similar 
when MOWN or NINOWN was excluded from the analyses. However, NINOWN 
was negative and significant at 5 percent level for Model 1 and Model 4 when BOWN 
was dropped from the models. 
 
Thirdly, further estimation were performed using the number of subsidiaries as the 
measure for diversification (i.e. the dependent variable). Only LEADSTR was 
negative and significant in the regressions (p < 0.10). Other hypothesis variables were 
not significant. 
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Fourthly, further test of ownership control based on directors' interest instead of 
manager's ownership was carried out. Similar to ownership control, the variable that 
proxied for directors' interest was not significant in all models. The results of other 
hypothesis variables were identical to the original results in Table 5. 
 
Fifthly, the model was re-estimated using the logit regression procedure based on 
single/multiple segment dichotomy. The results showed that the overall significance 
of the logit regression models was high as indicated by significant chi-square statistics 
(p < 0.001). However, only LEADSTR was significant at five percent level in the 
predicted direction. The results suggest that a continuous dependent variable might be 
more suitable than a binary dependent variable. 
 
Finally, regressions were also rerun to assess the extent to which the results were 
driven by outliers. However, the results based on Cook's Distance tests did not find 
any outlier in the database and hence, outlier bias was not present to give undue 
influence on the regression equations. 
 
Further tests showed that the results were not particularly sensitive to the size effect, 
different regression technique and different measures of dependent and hypothesis 
variables. Taken together, the results of the hypothesis variables are supportive of the 
theory proposed in the study especially with regards to the importance of outside 
blockholders and the separation of leadership structure in disciplining the 
management in terms of diversification activities. 
 
 
LIMITATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The present study examines the effect of ownership structure and corporate 
governance on firm diversification. The sample of the study comprises 219 companies 
listed on the KLSE for both the Main Board and the Second Board as of 31 December 
1995. The results showed that outside blockholding especially non-institutional 
blockholding was negatively associated with diversification. However, evidence of 
significant relationship between managerial ownership and diversification was not 
found although the directions were generally as expected. Similarly, good corporate 
governance was shown to reduce diversification activities. The variable for separate 
board structure was consistently significant in most of the estimations. However, the 
other measure of corporate governance namely the proportion of outside directors was 
not significant as might be expected. 
 
Taken together, the results suggest that outside blockholding especially non-
institutional blockholding could play an important role in overseeing the behaviour of 
management. Whilst most commentators suggest that the minority shareholders in 
Malaysia are not getting fairer treatment from the management or controlling 
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shareholders, this study shows that they are quite effective in disciplining the 
management (at least in curbing the diversification activities). Perhaps, they are 
beginning to realise their roles better and the recent move by the government to 
initiate the setting of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) (comprising 
the five biggest, state-owned, fund managers in the country, including Malaysia's 
biggest private pension plan, the Employees Provident Fund) is a step in the right 
direction. Similarly, separation of the roles of the Chief Executive and Chairman 
could also improve corporate governance as evidenced in this study. The result is 
consistent with the recommendation of the Code of Corporate Governance for the 
separate leadership structure to ensure an appropriate balance of power, increasing 
accountability and increasing capability of the board for independent decision 
making. 
 
Like any study, there are limitations to the design used. For example, the study 
considered only KLSE companies. The validation of the conclusions might not hold 
for small or medium companies. Similarly, the data was based on 1995 annual reports 
where diversification activity was believed to be at its peak before the Asian financial 
crisis. Perhaps, recent data especially after the implementation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance by the KLSE in the year 2001 might yield different results. 
Future studies should examine the effect of the Code on the level of corporate 
governance practised by KLSE listed companies and investigate the relationship of 
the variables with the level of diversification. Another potential limitation is related to 
the definition of what constitutes control in a company. The present study used five 
percent level as a cut-off point for determining the presence of the outside 
blockholding although it was by necessity, somewhat arbitrary. However, this 
criterion was provided by the Company Act 1965 to describe "substantial 
shareholder".  
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1  See for example Article 73, Table A, Fourth Schedule of Companies Act 1965 (Specimen articles of 
association). 
 
2  Note that beginning 1 January 2001, IAS 14 was superseded by MASB 22. 
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3 Major shareholders as defined by KLSE listing requirement are shareholders having at least              
5 percent of the aggregate of nominal amounts of all the voting shares in the firm. Major 
shareholders are also substantial shareholders as defined in Section 69D, Companies Act 1965 
(before amendment in 1998). 
 
4  See Part 4 of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. 
 
5  Some companies disclosed both direct and indirect interests and in many cases the same indirect 
shareholding was disclosed many times especially if the executive directors were family related. 
Hence, the problem of double counting could occur although great care was exercised to avoid this 
problem. Five companies were found to have managerial ownership of more than 100 percent and 
they were coded 100 percent for the purpose of this study. Note that maximum number for HSALES 
is also one as there was one case where a company disclosed two business segments but the figure 
for one of the segments was zero. However, the regression analyses without these companies 
produced similar results and do not alter the conclusion of the paper. 
 
6 Gujarati (1995) suggests that multicollinearity may be a problem when the correlation exceeded 0.80 
or if the VIF of a variable was more than 10. 
 
7  The T-test assumes the mean differences to be normally distributed while variances of each variable 
can be equal or unequal. The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is a nonparametric procedure used with two 
related variables to test the hypothesis that the two variables have the same distribution. They make 
no assumptions about the shapes of the distributions of the two variables. Note the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test is more appropriate than that Mann-Whitney U-Test if one or both sample sizes are greater 
than 10 (Jaccard & Becker, 1990). 
 
8  Note that the original uncorrected OLS results were very similar. 
 
9  The detailed results of the sensitivity analyses are available upon request. 
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